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Abstract: This paper describes a method of public key verification based on DNS, that can be used
to further increase security of package managers. On top of this method, an extended version is
proposed, that can also protect repository metadata. An implementation for the RPM ecosystem is
proposed corresponding to the theoretical background.
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1 INTRODUCTION
Package managers are an essential part of every modern Linux distribution. They are usually used to
distribute software packages, e.g. Wireshark or Firefox, but in general they can be used to manage
any kind of content. The primary method of package delivery is via the Internet, which is inherently
insecure, therefore it is necessary to ensure package integrity. This is done by using signatures, as
known from the public-key cryptography, and cryptographic hash functions [1]. But the public keys
themselves must be obtained somehow and considered trusted before they can be used. In the rest
of this paper, a method based on the Domain Name System (DNS) and applied to the RPM Package
Manager (the acronym is recursive) will be described, that can be used to further increase security.
Nowadays, when a user of some RPM based distribution (e.g. Fedora or CentOS) wants to install
a package for the first time, a series of steps precede the installation itself. First, the public key
is downloaded from the Uniform Resource Locator (URL) provided in the repository configuration
file. The key is usually a local file or a file available over the Hypertext Transfer Protocol Secure
(HTTPS). Then the frontend package manager asks the user whether the key is trusted and this is
the tricky part. The user must use a browser to find information about this key and compare the
fingerprint manually. The situation is even worse in case of automatic package installation as done
by Graphical User Interface (GUI) package managers or automation systems, e.g. Ansible. These
systems skip this step altogether as there is currently no way for them to do otherwise. Finally, the
key is imported and trusted forever. But again this is a problem because there is no automatic way
to inform the package manager, that the key was revoked. The information must be delivered to the
user, and he must manually remove the key.
2 STRUCTURE OF AN RPM PACKAGES REPOSITORY
Before the proposed extension can be further explained, an RPM repository needs to be described. It
is a server that contains repository metadata and a set of packages. The metadata is stored in 2 files:
repomd.xml and primary.xml. They contain hashes of the provided packages so that they can be tested
for corruption during transmission, but it cannot be used to verify authenticity as anyone can create
these hashes. The metadata files can be signed but they usually are not unlike in other distributions
like Debian or Gentoo, instead RPM includes signatures in every package so that each of them can be
verified separately.
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3 EXTENDING THE CURRENT SYSTEM WITH DNS
Based on the theoretical background introduced in the previous sections, two ways are proposed in
which the current package distribution system can be extended in order to prevent certain types of
attacks. The first version, which is called “minimal” is supposed to require only minimal changes
to the RPM ecosystem and it can prevent Man in the middle (MITM) attacks during the key import
phase as well as it can help with key revocation and replacement after a key leakage incident oc-
curres. The second version, called “extended”, builds on top of the minimal version and it can also
prevent so-called freeze attack [1], where the attacker restrains users from installing security updates
by providing only outdated packages.
3.1 MINIMAL VERSION
Both versions can be divided into server and client part. The server side represents a packager, a
person, a community or in general any entity, that creates packages, signs them and publishes them
on a domain (e.g. example.com). An assumption is made, that this entity owns this domain and
therefore it can publish new Resource Records (RR) in the authoritative DNS server for this domain.
This entity is represented by a Pretty Good Privacy (PGP) key pair, that is used for signing of the
packages. PGP keys are tied with an email address (e.g. packager@example.com), which belongs to
this domain as well. Conveniently, an RR type for PGP keys has already been standardized [2], so
the OPENPGPKEY RR type can be used to publish the public key in the DNS system. Finally, the
DNS system itself does not guarantee authenticity of its messages, in order to verify obtained RRs,
the Domain Name System Security Extensions (DNSSEC) must be used.
The client side is implemented in the Dandified Packaging Tool (dnf). When the client wants to install
a package from this repository for the first time, dnf downloads the PGP key from the web server using
HTTPS and now it can automatically verify this key using an implementation of a verifying resolver
(e.g. libundound), that downloads the key RR and verifies RR signatures from the key itself up to the
root zone. This is known as the DNSSEC chain of trust.
The second application, key revocation, is done by simply replacing the original key with a new one.
Whenever dnf wants to install a new package (this applies to updates as well, because an update is
basically installation of a new version), it first verifies all the keys and if there is some discrepancy,
it can check the web server for a new version of the verification key or it can just reject to install this
package.
3.2 EXTENDED VERSION
The DNS with DNSSEC can be utilized to further improve security of the whole package distribution
system especially in cases, where plain HTTP connection is used for communication with a repository.
As mentioned earlier, the freeze attack can be used against package managers. This attack vector
consists of MITM where the attacker provides old, but correctly signed packages and waits for new
security vulnerabilities to occur in installed packages (e.g. httpd).
In order to prevent this attack, a hash of the repository metadata and a timestamp can be included in
the DNS database. Of course, the timestamp has a short-period timeout, so that the RR cannot be
frozen as well. Also, the repository metadata can be signed. This is already supported by RPM, but
not widely used in Fedora. It works simply by creating a detached signature using GPG. The key used
for this purpose can be and should be different from the key used for signing packages. This structure
together with the package verification key resembles The Update Framework (TUF) as proposed in
[1] with the difference that it is implemented using DNS. The whole idea of the extended version is
captured in Figure 1. The yellow part is the RPM ecosystem that will not be modified, the blue part

























Figure 1: Structure of data stored inside a DNS server,its relation to RPM
repository and interaction with dnf
4 IMPLEMENTATION
A proof of concept implementation has been written using the Python language. The libunbound
library was used as a resolver implementation with Python API and so was the python-gnupg library,
which is a Python wrapper around the GPG tool. A virtual environment was created with a set of
DNS servers, that resembles the global DNS system, but it is possible to control it and create correct
and broken configurations, so that the implementation is properly tested.
5 CONCLUSION
In this paper, a way was described in which dnf can utilize DNS in order to increase security of
package management. Once the implementation is ready for production use, it will be included in
the upstream dnf and tested by Fedora users. If the system proves to be useful it can be beneficial
especially in cloud and desktop environment, where packages are installed non-interactively.
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